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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change has been called “the 
greatest market failure the world has 
seen,”1 and many are looking to the Mul-
tilateral Development Banks (MDBs) 
to help correct it. MDBs such as the 
World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) are public 
fi nancial institutions whose missions are 
to alleviate poverty by fi nancing proj-
ects and policy in developing countries. 
Many of their efforts focus on sectors 
that will be key to reducing greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions including energy, 
transport, forestry, and agriculture (see 
Box 1). They are also active in sectors 
where adaptation to the impacts of cli-
mate change is a critical challenge, such 
as water, health, and also agriculture. Un-
less economic development policies and 
practices reduce GHG emissions world-
wide, the resulting change in climate will 
bring harm to millions, particularly the 
poor. The MDBs have a central role to 
play in supporting low-carbon develop-
ment in their client countries. 
When the world’s leading industrialized 
nations (the G8) met in Gleneagles in 
2005, they agreed on an action plan 
on Climate Change, Clean Energy and 
Sustainable Development, which em-
phasized the role of MDBs in helping 
developing countries respond to climate 
change (see Box 2). The G8 tasked the 
World Bank with mobilizing an “invest-
ment framework for clean energy,” 
recognizing that the MDBs’ technical 
expertise, development policy advice, 
and investment support should play an 
essential part in catalyzing a transition 
to sustainable energy in a carbon con-
strained world. 
Since 2005, pressure on the Banks to 
address climate change has increased 
signifi cantly with calls for a “Climate 
Change Marshall Plan” to fi nance low 
carbon development,2 and for the World 
Bank to re-orient itself as a “bank for 
the environment.3 The 2007 Bali Action 
Plan adopted through the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) emphasizes the role the 
MDBs can play in supporting developing 
countries to identify appropriate national 
actions to address climate change. At the 
beginning of 2008, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Japan committed 
billions of dollars to a World Bank admin-
BOX 1
• Inter-American Development Bank: 
$2.1 billion (33 percent of total 2006 
lending of $6.4 billion) 
• European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development: $1.6 billion (25 
percent of total 2006 lending of $6.5 
billion)
• Asian Development Bank: $2.8 billion 
(38 percent of total 2006 lending of 
$7.4 billion)
Sources: World Bank Group 2007 Annual Report 
(Infrastructure; Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals 
sectors). IDB 2006 Annual Report (Energy; 
Transportation and Communication; Industry, 
Mining & Tourism; Productive Infrastructure 
sectors). ADB 2006 Annual Report (Energy; 
Transportation and Communications sectors). 
EBRD 2006 Annual Report (Natural Resources; 
Power and Energy; Municipal Infrastructure; and 
Transportation sectors).
MDBs and GHG Intensive Sectors 
MDBs provide fi nancing, policy advice, and 
some grants to developing and transitioning 
country governments and finance private 
sector actors (through debt, equity and guar-
antees) on behalf of the international com-
munity. The World Bank Group, for example, 
is owned by over 180 member governments. 
Each member government is a shareholder 
of the Bank: the number of shares a coun-
try holds is based roughly on the size of its 
economy. The United States is the largest 
shareholder, followed by Japan, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and France. As such, 
the G8 is especially infl uential in establish-
ing World Bank policies.MDB portfolios 
have signifi cant investments in sectors with 
substantial greenhouse gas emissions, includ-
ing transport, oil and gas, electric power, and 
mining. Recent annual investments in these 
sectors have totaled:
• World Bank Group: $9.8 billion (28 
percent of total 2007 lending of $34.7 
billion)
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istered Clean Technology Fund (see Box 
3) to help fi nance developing countries’ 
transitions to cleaner technologies. To 
rise to such tasks, MDBs will need to 
ensure that climate change becomes an 
integral component of their efforts to 
support sustainable economic develop-
ment and poverty reduction.
In early 2005, WRI’s policy brief Main-
streaming Climate Change at the Mul-
tilateral Development Banks found that 
climate change had been considered in 
less than 20 percent of the World Bank’s 
lending for the energy sector.4 Three 
years later, this policy brief reviews the 
Country Strategies, and project docu-
mentation for the energy sector portfo-
lios of the World Bank Group,5 the ADB, 
and the IDB. Some 35 percent of global 
GHGs come from electricity, heat, and 
other fuel combustion;6 an assessment of 
the extent to which climate change has 
been “mainstreamed” into these MDBs 
energy sector portfolios should therefore 
indicate the extent to which climate 
change has been “integrated” into their 
overall portfolios.7 
At a conceptual level, MDBs acknowl-
edge that climate change considerations 
need to be mainstreamed into their 
operations. Yet our analysis reveals that 
operationally, opportunities to mitigate 
emissions and reduce climate risk are 
still not systematically incorporated into 
MDB strategies and project development. 
More than 60 percent of fi nancing in the 
energy sector across these institutions 
does not consider climate change at all. 
MDBs remain heavily invested in “busi-
ness as usual,” despite recognizing the 
need for transformative changes. MDBs 
need to mainstream climate change, by 
consistently seeking opportunities to 
reduce emissions, promote low carbon 
growth, and respond to the likely im-
pacts of climate change when designing 
strategies and projects across their entire 
portfolios. To help correct the “world’s 
greatest market failure,” MDBs must do 
more to internalize the environmental 
and social costs of climate change into 
their decision-making. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE
In 2007, the Fourth Assessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded 
with unprecedented certainty8 that the 
observed global warming over the past 
50 years has resulted from human activi-
ties. The planet is warming as a result of 
increasing atmospheric concentrations of 
GHG emissions, which results primarily 
from the burning of fossil fuels and from 
deforestation. In his comprehensive 
review of the economic implications of 
climate change, Nicholas Stern, formerly 
the World Bank’s chief economist, con-
cluded that the costs of climate change 
from declining agricultural production, 
heat-waves, droughts, fl ooding events, 
biodiversity loss, disease spread, and soil 
erosion could consume 5 to 20 percent 
of global gross domestic product (GDP). 
While the details of Stern’s conclusions 
have been the subject of some academic 
debate, a political consensus is emerging 
that the costs of inaction will be much 
greater than the investment required to 
signifi cantly mitigate climate change. 
Addressing climate change demands 
leadership from industrialized nations, 
which have contributed most to the 
historical build up of GHGs in the atmo-
sphere. While poverty remains a major 
problem in developing countries, their 
contribution to global GHG emissions 
BOX 2
25 (c) work with interested borrower coun-
tries with signifi cant energy requirements 
to identify less greenhouse gas intensive 
growth options… and ensure that such op-
tions are integrated into Country Assistance 
Strategies;
25 (d) develop local commercial capacity to 
develop and fi nance cost-effective projects 
that promote energy efficiency and low-
carbon energy sources.
35 (a) Invite the World Bank to develop 
and implement ‘best practice’ guidelines 
for screening their investments in climate 
sensitive sectors to determine how their 
performance could be affected by climate 
risks, as well as how those risks can best be 
managed, in consultation with host govern-
ments and local communities…”
Source: Gleneagles Plan of Action on Climate 
Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Devel-
opment, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gle-
neagles_CCChangePlanofAction.pdf.
The Role of MDBs in the G8 2005 Gleneagles Plan of Action on 
Climate Change
In 2005, the G8 recognized the important 
role that MDBs could play in helping advance 
global efforts to respond to climate change. 
The Gleneagles plan of action committed 
the G8 to: 
 “9(a) Work with the multilateral development 
banks (MDBs) to expand the use of voluntary 
energy savings assessments as a part of major 
investments in new or existing projects in 
energy intensive sectors;
25 (a) make the best use of existing resources 
and financing instruments and develop a 
framework for energy investment to acceler-
ate the adoption of technologies which enable 
cleaner, more effi cient energy production 
and use;
25 (b) explore opportunities within their exist-
ing and new lending portfolios to increase the 
volume of investments made on renewable 
energy and energy effi ciency technologies 
consistent with the MDBs’ core mission of 
poverty reduction;
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BOX 3 Financing the Incremental Costs of Low Carbon Development? The Climate Investment Funds
In February 2008, the governments of the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Japan 
announced their intention to “[pool] efforts to 
support a new clean technology fund, admin-
istered by the World Bank, help developing 
countries bridge the gap between dirty and 
clean technology… and boost the World 
Bank’s ability to help developing countries 
tackle climate change.” 
The World Bank has proposed a portfolio of 
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) to “provide 
concessional fi nance for policy reforms and 
investments that achieve development goals 
through a transition to a low carbon develop-
ment path and a climate resilient economy.” 
As of April 2008, the World Bank proposes 
to establish a Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) 
which will support activities to build resilience 
to climate change (adaptation activities), as 
well as mitigation in the energy and forest 
sectors; and a separate Clean Technology 
Fund (CTF). The specifi c modalities of these 
funds are still being negotiated as of this 
publication. The CIFs will provide grants and 
concessional fi nance blended with fi nancing 
from the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and from Regional 
Development Banks (the Asian Development 
Bank, African Development Bank, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
and the Inter-American Development Bank). 
A range of instruments to leverage private 
sector investment will be used, and efforts 
made to integrate the CIFs into mainstream 
development fi nancing and policy dialogues. 
Donor countries and recipient developing 
countries will have equal representation on 
the governing committee. 
U.S. President George Bush has pledged $2 
billion to the CTF over the next three years 
although the U.S. Congress will have to ap-
prove this request. The U.K. pledged part of 
its £800 million ($1.6 billion) Environmental 
Transformation Fund, and has indicated that 
it will make additional contributions. Japan 
has also announced a $10 billion Cool Earth 
50 program to support developing countries 
address climate change, part of which will be 
directed through the CTF. 
In responding to initial proposals from the 
Banks on the structure of these funds, the 
international community has reinforced the 
notions that (i) the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) administered Adaptation 
Fund is the appropriate mechanism through 
which developed countries should meet their 
obligations to fi nance adaptation efforts; (ii) 
developing countries must have ownership of 
programs supported by the funds, and equal 
voice in their governance. 
Many observers have expressed concerns 
that activities and programs implemented 
through the CIFs and the CTF in particular 
may undermine or predetermine the outcomes 
of global negotiations on technology transfer 
and fi nancing taking place as part of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). More broadly, concerns have 
been raised about whether these funds will 
support or undermine established multilat-
eral mechanisms to implement the major 
environmental agreements. For example, the 
Convention on Biodiversity (particularly given 
that the CIFs may fund the protection of for-
ests). For its part, the World Bank has stated 
that the fund administration will be consistent 
with UNFCCC principles. Nevertheless, it 
remains to be seen whether the funds made 
available through the CIF will in fact be 
additional to development assistance com-
mitments in practice. In addition, the CIFs 
may not adequately refl ect the “polluter pays” 
principle—that developed countries must pay 
the costs of responding to climate change—
since developing countries will have to repay 
resources made available through concessional 
loans. Both the United States and Japan have 
suggested that their contributions to the CTF 
should be administered as grants. 
It is most urgent to deploy clean energy tech-
nologies in major economies that signifi cantly 
contribute to global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, whereas many of the World Bank’s 
clients are poor countries (where basic access 
to energy is still a serious development chal-
lenge) and relatively small emitters. For many 
of these countries, adaptation and resilience 
efforts that would be supported by the SCF 
may be a more immediate concern than miti-
gation. The CTF design is intended to support 
large scale emission reductions. While the use 
of these funds should be technology neutral 
so that the most appropriate technologies for 
local needs can be deployed at scale, clear 
principles for determining what is in fact most 
appropriate are urgently needed. The use of 
CIFs to promote the adoption of best available 
coal technologies to achieve such reductions is 
currently permitted. However, “best available” 
technologies such as supercritical coal are 
already more cost effective than conventional 
sub-critical coal in most cases, particularly 
since they require less fuel. It would seem a 
poor use of scarce resources to address climate 
change, to support investments in marginally 
less GHG intensive technologies that are al-
ready more cost effective than conventional 
coal and will still emit large amounts of carbon 
for decades to come. Technologies such as dis-
tributed renewable energy technologies, and 
some energy effi ciency programs (particularly 
those that improve the effi ciency and reach of 
transmission and distribution systems) are far 
more likely to have more direct benefi ts for 
poverty alleviation. Clean coal technologies, 
including carbon capture and sequestration 
ready facilities, may be able to play a role in 
reducing emissions from centralized energy 
infrastructure that powers economic growth, 
but are less likely to directly meet poverty al-
leviation and development priorities. 
It is essential that the CIFs spark truly trans-
formative changes in how climate change is 
integrated into economic development choices 
supported by the Multilateral Development 
Banks (MDBs). The success of the CIFs 
should be judged, at least in part, by whether 
they are supported by systematic changes in 
practice within the MDBs that mainstream 
climate change considerations into decision-
making. 
Sources: Henry Paulson, Alistair Darling & Fu-
kushiro Nukaga, “Financial bridge from dirty to 
clean” Financial Times, 7 Feb. 2008, http://search.
ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=paulson+darling+clim
ate+change&aje=true&id=080207000559&ct=0; 
Reuters, “Finance chiefs urge support for 
clean energy fund” 7 Feb. 2008, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/
idUKN0763586520080207; 
Prayas Energy Group, “Some Good News in 
the Power Sector: Initial Success in Solicitations 
for Ultra Mega Power Projects” Economic and 
Political Weekly Jan 2007, http://prayaspune.
org/peg/publications/ultra_mega_commentary_
epw_081A01.pdf
World Bank, “Consultation Draft on Climate 
Investment Funds”, 22 Jan. 2008; World Bank, 
Proposal for a Strategic Climate Fund, 3 April 
2008.
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is growing rapidly. For example, China’s 
2007 carbon emissions are thought to 
have exceeded U.S. annual emissions.9 
Even if industrialized countries reduce 
their GHG emissions by 90 percent, sig-
nifi cant emission reductions by develop-
ing countries will be necessary to keep 
global warming within 2o Celsius.10 At the 
same time, the rising costs of conven-
tional fossil fuels such as oil and growing 
concerns about energy security in both 
developed and developing countries 
have sparked new interest in alternative 
energy choices, and a new opportunity 
to invest in low carbon options.
Since 1994, the Bank’s major sharehold-
ers and the majority of its client countries 
have been parties to the UNFCCC and, 
with the notable exception of the United 
States, have joined the Convention’s 
Kyoto Protocol (see Box 4).11 Parties to 
these instruments are “guided” by the 
principle that policies and measures to 
protect the climate system should be 
integrated into national development 
programs “in order to achieve sustain-
able development.”12 Guided also by 
the principle of “common but differenti-
ated responsibility,” developed countries 
have committed to helping developing 
countries meet the incremental costs of 
mitigating climate change. Furthermore, 
they have committed to helping develop-
ing countries meet the additional costs 
of adapting to climate change. 
The idea that developing countries will 
also take actions to respond to climate 
change (both for mitigation and adapta-
tion purposes) is central to the Bali Ac-
tion Plan adopted by the parties to the 
UNFCCC in December 2007 (see Box 
5). These “measurable, reportable and 
verifi able” actions must be nationally 
appropriate, embedded in sustainable 
development strategies, and supported 
by technology transfer and fi nance. The 
Bali Action Plan explicitly notes the im-
portance of multilateral bodies such as 
the MDBs in supporting both mitigation 
of climate change and adaptation to the 
impacts of climate change “in a coherent 
and integrated manner.”13
The Bali Action Plan’s emphasis on these 
factors suggests a central role for MDBs 
in this global response, as facilitators 
of national sustainable development 
strategies in their client countries. As 
providers of policy and fi nancial assis-
tance, MDBs are likely to be one vehicle 
through which developed countries sup-
port developing countries’ mitigation 
and adaptation efforts.14 MDBs must 
help developing countries calculate 
the incremental costs of low carbon 
development, and then work to identify 
creative and legitimate ways to meet 
them, for example by accessing grant 
funding, including through the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) which has 
provided billions of dollars for climate 
mitigation, as well as the new proposed 
Climate Investment Funds. The MDBs 
must also provide technical assistance, 
knowledge, and financing to support 
developing countries to defi ne, design 
and implement appropriate actions to 
respond to climate change. 
III. THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF MULTILATERAL 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
MDBs have launched many new initia-
tives to address climate change over the 
past three years including efforts to: (i) 
account for GHG emissions and improve 
energy effi ciency; (ii) support renewable 
energy; (iii) manage forests sustainably; 
(iv) promote carbon finance; and (v) 
adapt to climate change. In addition, they 
BOX 4 The Special Role of the United States
The United States, as the World Bank’s 
dominant shareholder, nominates the Bank’s 
President, and through its replenishment 
of the Bank’s International Development 
Agency, helps shape Bank policy. Historically, 
it has also been the world’s leading contribu-
tor of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and, 
beyond its UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) commitments, 
has been reluctant to engage in signifi cant 
multilateral efforts to confront global cli-
mate change and invest in GHG emissions 
reductions. 
The United States has played an important 
role in prompting international financial 
institutions to link environmental and social 
considerations to their operations and invest-
ments, but until recently this has not included 
support for a Bank role in slowing global 
warming. Indeed, even as the World Bank 
worked to develop a Clean Energy Invest-
ment Framework (CEIF), U.S. government 
representatives undermined efforts to use 
the Framework to prioritize climate change 
in the Bank’s operations. According to the 
former Chief Scientist of the World Bank, 
Robert Watson, deputies of former World 
Bank President Paul Wolfowitz with close ties 
to the Bush administration, sought to water 
down references to climate change in early 
drafts of the CEIF. 
In recent months, however, U.S. positions 
have begun to shift, refl ecting in part the 
political momentum currently observed 
within the United States on the need for a 
federal policy on climate change mitigation. 
The U.S. government’s recent pledge to 
commit $2 billion to support clean technol-
ogy research through a World Bank Group 
administered fund is a tangible sign of the 
beginnings of a change in attitude regarding 
the role of MDBs in a global response to 
climate change. 
Source: Krishna Guha, Deputy’s woes stir World 
Bank turmoil, Financial Times, 25 April 2007, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e67b4470-f2c8-11db-
a454-00b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1.
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have produced signifi cant new research 
and analysis to advance understanding 
of the linkages between climate change 
and economic development. 
Greenhouse gas accounting and energy 
effi ciency. The European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD) 
has been a leader on these issues: it 
accounts for GHG emissions associated 
with all projects expected to emit more 
than 20,000 tons of C02-eq. (see Box 6). 
Emissions are calculated for the project 
as a whole rather than for the Bank’s 
funded portion. Similarly, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation’s (IFC) 
environmental and social performance 
standards require that clients account 
for GHG emissions for all projects ex-
pected to emit more than 100,000 tons 
of C02-eq. Clients are also required to 
consider project design options that 
would result in reduced emissions.15 
These standards have subsequently 
been adopted by private fi nancial in-
stitutions that have signed onto the 
Equator Principles. In 2007, former 
World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz 
announced that the World Bank Group 
institutions would begin to measure and 
manage the GHG emissions associated 
with their portfolios; the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD), the International De-
velopment Agency (IDA), and the IFC 
are still exploring how to operationalize 
these commitments in practice, howev-
er. Transparent GHG accounting should 
facilitate more accurate assessments of 
the incremental costs associated with 
reducing emissions, which can in turn 
help project managers and MDB clients 
fi nd ways to fi nance these incremental 
costs. 
Renewable Energy: MDBs have played 
an important role in supporting renew-
able energy projects in developing 
countries, including through imple-
mentation of projects supported by 
grants from the GEF. The World Bank 
Group is an implementing agency of 
the GEF,16 and other MDBs including 
the ADB, EBRD and IDB, are “execut-
ing agencies” that can also implement 
GEF projects. 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation: 
The World Bank Group has played an 
important role in the international de-
velopment community by presenting 
BOX 5 The Bali Action Plan
Underpinning the Bali Action Plan (BAP) 
is the concept that both developed and de-
veloping countries will undertake mitigation 
actions. These efforts will include: 
“1.b.(i) Measurable, reportable and verifi able 
nationally appropriate mitigation commit-
ments or actions, including quantifi ed emis-
sion limitation and reduction objectives, by 
all developed country Parties, while ensuring 
the comparability of efforts among them, tak-
ing into account differences in their national 
circumstances; 
(ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
by developing country Parties in the context 
of sustainable development, supported and 
enabled by technology, fi nancing and capac-
ity-building, in a measurable, reportable and 
verifi able manner. …
(vii) Ways to strengthen the catalytic role of 
the Convention in encouraging multilateral 
bodies, the public and private sectors and 
civil society, building on synergies among 
activities and processes, as a means to sup-
port mitigation in a coherent and integrated 
manner;…”
“1.(c) Enhanced action on adaptation, includ-
ing, inter alia, consideration of: …(v) Ways to 
strengthen the catalytic role of the Conven-
tion in encouraging multilateral bodies, the 
public and private sectors and civil society, 
building on synergies among activities and 
processes, as a means to support adaptation in 
a coherent and integrated manner;…”
“1.(e) Enhanced action on the provision of 
fi nancial resources and investment to sup-
port action on mitigation and adaptation and 
technology cooperation, including, inter alia, 
consideration of:
(i) Improved access to adequate, predictable 
and sustainable fi nancial resources and fi nan-
cial and technical support, and the provision 
of new and additional resources, including 
offi cial and concessional funding for develop-
ing country Parties; …
(v) Mobilization of public- and private-sector 
funding and investment, including facilitation 
of carbon-friendly investment choices; 
(vi) Financial and technical support for 
capacity-building in the assessment of the 
costs of adaptation in developing countries, 
in particular the most vulnerable ones, to aid 
in determining their fi nancial needs…”
BOX 6 Mainstreaming Energy Effi ciency at the EBRD 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) screens all projects 
for potential energy effi ciency components 
as part of the appraisal process, and rates 
projects based on their potential for saving 
energy. It is the only MDB with an explicit 
mandate to promote energy effi ciency, and 
has a dedicated energy efficiency team 
that works with its corporate and industrial 
clients to conduct energy effi ciency audits 
to identify opportunities for energy savings. 
Under EBRD’s 2006 energy strategy, project 
managers are required to calculate the costs 
of not taking advantage of opportunities for 
energy effi ciency, as well as the potential 
gains of doing so. 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. EBRD Sustainability Report 2006: 
Promoting Sound and Sustainable Development, 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/general/sus06.pdf. 
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sustainable forest management as an 
opportunity to mitigate climate change 
in developing countries. Deforestation 
accounts for nearly 20 percent of global 
GHG emissions, and the World Bank has 
been very active in the forest sector.17 
It is therefore important for the World 
Bank to integrate climate considerations 
into all of its forest activities. Inde-
pendent reviews of the Bank’s record 
in the forestry sector suggest mixed 
performance on environmental issues 
and on governance. For example, the 
World Bank’s Inspection Panel recently 
concluded that the World Bank had not 
complied with its own policies on the 
need to take the rights of indigenous 
people into account in supporting for-
est reform in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.18 The MDBs will need to 
focus more on fundamental issues of hu-
man rights and forest governance that lie 
at the heart of deforestation. 19 In Octo-
ber 2007 the World Bank launched a new 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility to 
explore ways to harness carbon markets 
to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and degradation (see Box 7). Over the 
past year, the idea of Reducing GHG 
Emissions from Deforestation in Devel-
oping Countries (REDD) has attracted 
signifi cant political attention, particularly 
through UNFCCC processes. The World 
Bank has emerged as a “de facto” global 
mechanism for donor coordination on 
forests and climate change. Ideally, these 
efforts should reward countries that pro-
tect the rights of forest dependent com-
munities and empower them to have a 
more central role in forest management, 
while also reducing GHG emissions and 
protecting the critical ecosystem services 
forests provide.
Carbon Finance: MDBs have also 
been active in carbon fi nance, particu-
larly through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (see Box 8).20 Through the CDM, 
GHG-reducing projects in developing 
countries (e.g., installing wind-based 
power instead of coal-fi red power) can 
generate emission credits that can then 
be used by industrialized countries to 
offset their own domestic emissions, as 
required under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
World Bank has pioneered these efforts 
through its Prototype Carbon Fund, 
which was established in 2000, and now 
has more than eleven different carbon 
funds in place. Efforts are underway 
to scale up the role of carbon fi nance 
in bank operations through its Carbon 
Partnership Facility (CPF). The IFC, for 
its part, is focusing its efforts on helping 
project developers address risks associ-
ated with delivering emission reduc-
tions to the market. In 2006, the ADB 
launched a new Carbon Market Initia-
tive to expand the scope and ambition of 
its carbon fi nance activities. Through its 
Sustainable Energy and Climate Change 
Initiative, the IDB also intends to launch 
new carbon fi nance funds.
Adaptation to Climate Change: The 
MDBs have implemented a number of 
pilot projects (both loan and grant) to 
address climate risk in sectors such as 
agriculture, water and rural infrastruc-
ture. The World Bank has developed 
a “Climate Risk Screening Tool” that 
enables project managers to identify 
vulnerabilities and consider responses 
to make their projects more resilient 
to the impacts of climate change. IFC 
is exploring methodologies to evaluate 
BOX 7
Mobilizing Carbon Markets to Reduce Deforestation: 
The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
Deforestation is a major source of carbon 
dioxide emissions—roughly 20 percent 
globally—that contributes to global warming 
and also causes local air pollution. Tropical 
forests have immense biodiversity value, and 
their loss and degradation is a major problem 
for the millions of people dependent on forest 
ecosystem services for their livelihoods. New 
proposed programs implemented through 
the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) are expected to play a central 
role in the global “learning” process on how 
to reduce emissions from deforestation in 
developing countries. 
The FCPF is a $300 million effort that in-
cludes a “Readiness Mechanism” of $100 mil-
lion to help developing countries get “ready” to 
trade credits from deforestation, and a Carbon 
Finance Mechanism of $200 million. In defi n-
ing “Readiness” under the FCPF, the World 
Bank has focused on technical requirements 
for quantifying emissions reductions, tracking 
forest cover change, and distributing fi nancial 
incentives. Yet the drivers of deforestation are 
enormously complex, and there are signifi cant 
risks that a carbon market driven approach 
could create perverse incentives. 
The World Bank’s own record on governance 
and environmental sustainability in the 
forestry sector has been mixed. Further, in 
developing the FCPF, there has been limited 
stakeholder engagement at the local level, 
and the fundamental issues of human rights 
and forest governance have not always been 
emphasized. As the trustee of the FCPF, 
the World Bank is tasked with aligning the 
objectives of forested developing countries, 
donor governments and prospective buyers of 
emission reductions from the facility, in order 
to create a commodity that can be bought 
and sold. Because the bulk of the FCPF’s 
resources are dedicated to Carbon Finance, 
there may be pressure to fi nd countries ready 
to participate in these transactions even 
though the fundamental challenges of readi-
ness have not been resolved. In setting up a 
new line of business through this facility, the 
World Bank is in a position where its ability to 
gauge whether the Facility is effectively meet-
ing its objectives may be compromised, and 
thus faces a potential confl ict of interest. 
Source: World Bank Draft Information Memoran-
dum on the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(December 2007). 
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the risks of climate change for its invest-
ments and clients.21 The World Bank 
now serves as a trustee for the GEF 
administered Adaptation Fund, which is 
fi nanced by a 2 percent charge on CDM 
transactions. MDBs are also exploring 
ways to use fi nancial instruments that 
have been designed to address natural 
disasters, in order to address climate risk. 
The World Bank serves as trustee of the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery, a $50 million facility to 
support countries considered at high risk 
of natural hazards to develop and imple-
ment disaster risk mitigation strategies. 
The IDB has a Disaster Prevention Fund 
and a Disaster Prevention Sector Facility 
aimed at helping countries reduce vul-
nerability to natural hazards. In addition, 
the IFC and World Bank are preparing 
a commercial facility, the Global Index 
Reinsurance Facility, to insure people 
in poor countries against weather and 
natural catastrophe risk. 
While the MDBs have many new initia-
tives in place to address climate change, 
however, core fi nancing decisions still 
do not always give due emphasis to op-
tions to mitigate and respond to climate 
change. 
IV. INTEGRATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
CONSIDERATIONS INTO 
OPERATIONS
In this section, we assess the degree 
to which climate change concerns are 
refl ected in the country strategies and 
energy lending portfolios of the World 
Bank Group (IBRD, IDA and IFC), the 
ADB, and the IDB.
Country Strategies22 are used by MDBs 
to plan their support to each of their bor-
rowing countries. These strategies are 
often developed in partnership with the 
borrowing country, and are intended to 
provide a sound understanding of devel-
opment challenges, as well as to identify 
priority sectors for Bank engagement. 
While these strategies must be country 
driven to respond to national needs, the 
MDBs are well placed to link national 
priorities to global challenges such as 
climate change. Country Strategies are 
therefore a logical starting point for 
MDBs to begin working with developing 
countries to consider opportunities to 
address climate change. 
In preparing this policy brief, WRI re-
viewed all active Country Strategies at 
the World Bank, IDB and ADB.23 We as-
sess whether each strategy: (i) identifi ed 
priority sectors that are central to climate 
change mitigation or will be affected 
by climate change; (ii) set any goals to 
mitigate GHG emissions in these sectors; 
(iii) considered the potential to adapt to 
the potential impacts of climate change; 
(iv) considered options to meet the incre-
mental costs of low carbon development; 
and (v) considered the additional costs of 
adaptation. The complete results of our 
country strategy analysis are included 
in Annex 1 of this policy brief (available 
online at http://www.wri.org/iffe).
Next, we take a close look at the MDBs’ 
portfolios in the energy sector. Since en-
ergy is at the heart of the challenge of 
mitigating climate change, the consider-
ation of climate change in this portfolio 
should refl ect the extent to which these 
issues have been mainstreamed into 
the MDBs’ operations overall. MDBs 
have made highly signifi cant interven-
tions in the energy sector in developing 
countries to support reliable access to 
energy. We review publicly available 
documentation for all energy projects 
supported between 2000 and 2007. We 
assess each energy sector loan against 
four criteria: (i) whether GHG emis-
sions associated with the project were 
accounted for; (ii) whether alternative 
approaches that would have been more 
climate friendly were considered, such 
as options to enhance efficiency, low 
carbon technologies, measures to build 
the capacity of the recipient institution 
to manage emissions or otherwise deal 
with climate change; (iii) whether op-
tions to access additional resources to 
meet the “incremental costs” of less 
GHG intensive approaches (including al-
ternative technologies) were considered; 
and (iv) whether the planned outputs 
or outcomes of supporting the projects 
include any climate change consider-
ations (such as reduced GHG emissions, 
enhanced capacity manage clean energy 
BOX 8 MDBs and the Carbon Market
MDBs have historically played a central role 
in international carbon fi nance, helping to in-
form international practice. The carbon mar-
kets are increasingly crowded as the private 
sector steps into the opportunity space carved 
out by the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). Yet the CDM has not promoted 
fundamental shifts in infrastructure choices, 
and CDM projects have tended to remain on 
the margins of “core” sector decision-making. 
The role of carbon finance in deploying 
new clean energy technologies at scale and 
delivering real development impacts has not 
always been clear. The World Bank may be 
well placed to explore new ways to harness 
carbon markets in combination with policy 
changes and the principles of co-benefi ts to 
enable more fundamental changes in infra-
structure choice. 
Sources: Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism’s Performance and Poten-
tial, Stanford Program on Energy for Sustainable 
Development (Working Paper 56, July 2006). 
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technologies, other regulatory or policy 
reform to support low carbon growth). 
This analysis does not fully address the 
extent to which vulnerability to climate 
change—which is a signifi cant risk for 
this sector—has been incorporated into 
project development and appraisal. 
If more than two of these criteria have 
been fully met, we consider climate 
change to have been “integrated.” All of 
these criteria will not be relevant in each 
case: for example, it might not be appro-
priate to calculate the GHG emissions 
of a loan to improve the management 
capacity of a power utility. However, 
such a project could be assessed on the 
basis of whether it included support for 
measures such as efforts to build the 
capacity of that utility to manage GHG 
emissions, or incorporate low carbon 
technologies into its energy mix. If a 
project meets one or two criteria, then 
we consider climate change to have 
been “mentioned.” If none of these 
criteria are met, then climate change 
is “not considered” or “ignored.” The 
complete results of our energy loan 
portfolio analysis are presented in 
Annex 2 of this policy brief (available 
online at http://www.wri.org/iffe).
It would be useful to assess the extent 
to which these criteria are met in MDB 
portfolios for other key GHG inten-
sive sectors such as transport or urban 
development to gain a more complete 
understanding of the extent to which 
climate change has been mainstreamed 
into overall MDB portfolios, although 
such analysis is beyond the scope of 
this policy brief. It is also necessary to 
develop criteria to assess the extent to 
which adaptation has been integrated 
into projects in sectors that are highly 
vulnerable to climate change such as 
health, water, and agriculture. 
The World Bank Group
In developing its “Clean Energy Invest-
ment Framework” (CEIF), the World 
Bank focused on opportunities to: (i) 
extend access to energy services, particu-
larly for the poor in Africa; (ii) explore 
options for low carbon growth; and (iii) 
build capacity to adapt to climate vari-
ability and change. Early versions of the 
CEIF were criticized for framing their 
efforts against “business as usual” GHG 
emission scenarios of 450 ppm to 1,000 
ppm, rather than actively trying to help 
fi nd solutions to keep global warming 
within 2o Celsius. In response to an 
independent review of its record in the 
Extractive Industries that concluded the 
World Bank should phase out of new 
investments in coal and oil, in 2004 the 
Bank committed to increasing its sup-
port for renewable energy projects by 20 
percent per year over the next fi ve years 
(although this target was set relative to 
an unusually low baseline level of invest-
ment).24 This target has now become a 
central element of the progress the Bank 
has reported in implementing the CEIF. 
As Box 4 notes, representatives of World 
Bank President Paul Wolfowitz’s offi ce 
and some governors of the Bank did not 
consistently prioritize the climate change 
agenda even after the Gleneagles Plan of 
Action was released. 
The Bank also launched a Carbon Part-
nership Facility (CPF) in 2007, which 
seeks to make strategic, transformative 
interventions in key sectors by linking 
policy reform efforts and technical as-
sistance efforts that generate large scale 
emission reductions with carbon fi nance 
revenues. It is intended to create new 
partnerships between companies and 
governments that would sell emission 
reductions, and prospective buyers of 
reduction credits. Realizing these objec-
tives will require signifi cant innovations 
in methodologies for measuring and 
verifying emission reductions in a plau-
sible way. It will be essential to ensure 
that projects implemented through the 
CPF are consistent with—and do not 
predetermine—the outcomes of negotia-
tions on the role of carbon fi nance under 
the UNFCCC (see Box 8). 
In late 2007 the World Bank Group be-
gan developing a “Strategic Framework 
on Climate Change and Development” 
that considers a range of climate change 
implications for its mission and opera-
tions. The IFC is developing a climate 
change strategy for its corporate fund-
ing portfolio that seeks to capitalize 
on emerging opportunities to invest in 
clean energy technologies, and to partner 
with fi nancial institutions in developing 
countries to support renewable and ef-
fi ciency projects. IFC is also exploring 
new approaches to project development 
including the use of a “shadow price” for 
carbon that would allow project manag-
ers to begin to integrate the costs of 
climate change into project development 
(see Box 11). 
Country Strategies:25 Several of the World 
Bank CASs have begun to integrate miti-
gation and adaptation considerations, but 
overall attention to these issues in CASs 
remains inconsistent. Of the 54 CASs 
reviewed, only 32 mention opportunities 
for GHG mitigation in sector level inter-
ventions; and 18 identify concrete targets 
or outputs to this end. Many CASs for 
major emerging economies note op-
portunities to reduce emissions. For 
example, the Mexico strategy discusses 
opportunities to reduce emissions from 
energy, industry, and transport, and sets 
clear goals to scale up renewable energy 
options. It considers a variety of possible 
sources of fi nancing for these low carbon 
options including carbon fi nance and 
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GEF funds. However, the Bank does not 
yet take climate change considerations 
into account in all energy sector inter-
ventions in recipient countries: for exam-
ple, the Philippines CAS emphasizes the 
need to restructure the power sector, but 
fails to consider the major opportunities 
that could exist to develop renewable en-
ergy and reduce GHGs in this context.26 
The CAS for Honduras notes the need to 
reduce deforestation and emissions from 
unsustainable agricultural practices. By 
contrast, the Cambodia CAS emphasizes 
forestry as a priority sector for World 
Bank involvement without considering 
climate change at all. 
With regard to adaptation to climate 
change, 6 of the 54 CASs reviewed note 
vulnerability to climate change, and 3 
CASs include indicators or targets re-
lated to adaptation, while 5 additional 
strategies consider opportunities to 
access adaptation fi nance. The CAS for 
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States gives signifi cant attention to cli-
mate change vulnerability, sets targets 
to improve disaster risk management 
and adaptation, and opportunities to 
access GEF fi nancing to support these 
programs. On the other hand, while 
the World Bank’s current CAS for Ban-
gladesh emphasizes natural disaster 
management as a priority issue for the 
country, it does not mention the impacts 
of climate change as an additional factor 
that will further strain these efforts and 
the economy. These examples illustrate 
the need for more systematic attention 
to how climate change is linked to the 
development choices of the countries 
the World Bank supports. 
A key related challenge is to reconcile 
private sector investment strategies with 
the climate change and energy for sus-
tainable development agendas. For ex-
ample, a two volume World Bank strategy 
to “Revitalize Infrastructure Investment 
in Brazil” notes that Brazil’s environ-
mental licensing procedures present a 
signifi cant administrative hurdle and that 
environmental considerations need to be 
incorporated into upstream policy and 
planning. But the Bank’s strategy makes 
almost no mention of renewable energy 
and effi ciency options (despite the fact 
that Brazil has very progressive legisla-
tion in place, that is driving signifi cant 
investment in clean energy). Nor does it 
mention the potential impacts of climate 
change and changing water levels on 
reliability of water supply, which could 
signifi cantly affect this hydropower de-
pendent program.
Energy Portfolio: Our analysis of the 
World Bank’s recent annual energy proj-
ect portfolio reveals some improvement 
in the extent to which it has considered 
climate change (see Figure 1). However, 
in 2007, almost 50 percent of lending in 
this sector was made without any atten-
tion to climate change at all. 
Over the past three years, less than 30 
percent of its fi nancing has met more 
than two of the criteria for “integrating” 
climate change into decision-making. 
The IFC has noted the relevance of cli-
mate change in the majority of its energy 
sector projects, but has only managed to 
integrate GHG emissions reductions into 
less than 10 percent of these efforts when 
measured by volume of fi nancing (see 
Figure 2).27 Oil & gas projects and coal 
fi red power continue to play a signifi cant 
role in its portfolio. 
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The Asian Development Bank
A review undertaken by the ADB in 
2000 of its 1995 energy strategy revealed 
a mixed record of success in integrat-
ing environmental considerations into 
energy projects.28 Subsequently, the 
ADB initiated an effort to develop a 
new energy strategy, with an emphasis 
on “clean energy” to power soaring eco-
nomic growth in the Asia region. In July 
2005, the ADB established a $1 billion 
Energy Efficiency Initiative with the 
aim of compiling and analyzing existing 
knowledge and experience on energy ef-
fi ciency policies, and formulating a clean 
energy investment strategy. In 2008 the 
ADB announced a new fund for climate 
change with an initial capitalization of 
$40 million.
In 2007 the ADB released a new draft of 
its energy strategy for review, organized 
around three themes: (i) meeting energy 
demand in a sustainable way; (ii) energy 
access; and (iii) energy sector reforms 
and governance. The draft strategy seeks 
to keep a range of energy options and 
technologies with signifi cant associated 
environmental and social risks eligible 
for ADB support, placing a greater 
emphasis on compliance with environ-
mental and social due diligence on a 
case by case project basis for ensuring 
“environmental sustainability.” 
Country Strategies:29 Recent ADB coun-
try strategies have increasingly made 
note of opportunities to reduce GHG 
emissions. Of the fi fteen strategies re-
viewed, twelve recognized the need to 
improve efficiency and reduce GHG 
emissions associated with interventions 
in the energy sector. Less than fi ve of 
these strategies, however, also commit-
ted to specifi c targets or indicators to 
respond to these needs. For example, the 
Cambodia CAS notes the need to address 
environmental impacts of dependence 
on fossil fuels for power, but does not 
set any targets or consider any options 
to meet this objective. By contrast the 
CAS for Indonesia notes the need to en-
hance effi ciency and reduce dependence 
on oil, and then sets goals to reduce air 
emissions, and also notes the need to 
fi nd CDM opportunities to fi nance some 
of these lower emission options. ADB 
country strategies for Bangladesh, the 
Maldives, Mongolia, and Papua New 
Guinea make explicit mention of vulner-
ability concerns. A few strategies, such as 
those for Vietnam and Bangladesh, also 
identify specifi c outputs and targets to 
increase resilience to the likely impacts 
of climate change. In general, country 
strategies do not consistently note vul-
nerabilities specifi cally related to the 
expected impacts of climate change. 
Energy Portfolio: Climate change has 
tended to be a peripheral consideration 
in energy sector projects at the ADB (see 
Figure 3). In 2007, however, shortly after 
the launch of its new programs on clean 
energy and climate change, a signifi cant 
improvement is observed in the extent to 
which climate change considerations are 
refl ected in project documentation. This 
improvement seems to stem in part from 
implementation of its Energy Effi ciency 
initiative, which involves screening all 
projects for effi ciency opportunities, and 
monitoring effi ciency components in its 
energy portfolio. It remains to be seen 
whether this emphasis will be sustained, 
and whether these changes are support-
ing transformative reductions in GHG 
emissions from energy sector projects in 
Asian countries.
Indeed, the terms of ADB’s engagement 
in the power sector are controversial. 
The Bank is increasing its support for 
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coal-fi red thermal power plants although 
it acknowledges that these projects have 
negative impacts for climate change 
(see Box 9). In addition, its new energy 
strategy seems to open up space for 
ADB to venture further into high risk 
projects—including large hydropower—
in countries with weak environmental 
governance at the national and local lev-
els. At the same time, ADB is in the midst 
of revising its environmental, indigenous 
peoples and involuntary resettlement 
safeguards, with a view to allowing itself 
greater fl exibility in applying these met-
rics. There is serious cause for concern 
that these revisions may significantly 
weaken ADB’s internal standards, by 
undermining the need for robust Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessments prior to 
project implementation.30 
The Inter-American 
Development Bank
In November 2006 the IDB launched a 
Sustainable Energy and Climate Change 
Initiative (SECCI) in response to the 
growing interest of its member countries 
in alternative approaches to energy sup-
ply, particularly in the context of rising 
global prices for oil and gas. Focal areas 
of SECCI include: the promotion of 
renewable energy and energy effi ciency; 
biofuels development; increasing the 
access of member countries to carbon 
fi nance; and adaptation to the impacts 
of climate change. Senior management 
has focused on internal reorganizations 
within the IDB over the past year, which 
has slowed progress on the initiative. 
Through SECCI, however, energy ef-
fi ciency programs have been integrated 
BOX 9 Coal Fired Power in Asia
Coal plays a central role in Asia’s electricity 
mix, and current policy, planning and regula-
tory frameworks for the region align to keep 
coal fi red power one of the cheapest (and easi-
est) options to meet the electricity demands 
of powering rapid economic growth. In 2006 
the Indian Ministry of Power announced an 
Ultra Mega Power Program to build seven 
4GW supercritical coal fi red power plants 
over the next few years. In Indonesia a pro-
gram to add 10,000 MW of coal fi red power by 
2009 is underway. In 2006 China installed 90 
gigawatts of coal-fi red power capacity–these 
plants alone will emit nearly 500 million tons 
of carbon dioxide each year. Governments 
continue to extend signifi cant support for coal 
power. While investment in new coal fi red 
generation is commercially viable within cur-
rent regulatory frameworks, the Banks’ policy 
advice and financial incentives can guide 
markets and regulators towards more energy 
effi cient and lower carbon choices. 
These developments underline the urgency of 
fi nding new solutions to the climate impacts 
of coal, even as new ways to orient policy 
frameworks to refl ect the real costs of coal 
power are sought. Coal power has severely 
problematic environmental and social im-
pacts beyond climate change throughout its 
supply chain: for example, coal-fi red thermal 
power plants use large amounts of water, and 
can have highly disruptive impacts on water 
ecosystems, and in turn on the people who 
depend on them; the coal industry is fraught 
with safety hazards (including environmental 
health) for its employees. 
In its leadership of the 2008 G8 processes, 
the government of Japan has highlighted the 
importance of addressing the challenge of coal 
fi red power, noting that: “all the coal-fi red 
power plants are the real crux of the issue… 
and will defi ne whether we peak and [reduce] 
emissions in time.” Technologies to capture 
and store the carbon dioxide from coal-fi red 
power generation are attracting signifi cant 
interest from a climate perspective. The costs 
associated with such “carbon capture and stor-
age” technologies remain very high, however, 
and there is signifi cant scientifi c uncertainty 
around the technology. 
Source: Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, special advisor to 
the Japanese Cabinet on Climate Change, “Climate 
Change and the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit,” 
Brookings Institution 3 March 2008.
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into several projects in energy intensive 
sectors. SECCI is also supporting spe-
cialized environment and climate change 
policy programs in Mexico and Colom-
bia. In addition, the IDB has been work-
ing with governments in Central America 
and the Caribbean to develop detailed 
diagnostic studies on the scope to de-
velop biofuels. Yet the rush to produce 
more biofuels is fraught with many risks 
for sustainable development—indeed 
not all biofuels are less GHG intensive 
than fossil fuels. The spikes in food prices 
experienced in early 2008, for example, 
have drawn global attention to the links 
between promoting the production of 
biofuels and displacing food production. 
By integrating measures such as life cycle 
GHG accounting and options analysis, 
and ensuring the robust application of 
high environmental and social standards 
to all projects it supports, the IDB might 
be able to help its client countries avoid 
and overcome these problems (see Box 
10). The IDB is now developing sustain-
ability guidelines for biofuels. 
Country Strategies:31 Few of the IDB’s 
country strategies consider climate 
change. The Chile country strategy em-
phasizes the need to develop alternative 
sources of clean energy and improve 
effi ciency within the sector. The Costa 
Rica strategy notes the potential for 
wind energy, and the Uruguay strategy 
recognizes the need for energy effi cien-
cy. Strategies for both the Dominican 
Republic and Jamaica note increasing 
vulnerability to natural disasters and the 
need to manage weather related risks, 
although the implications of climate 
change for increasing these risks are not 
considered. 
Energy Portfolio: Climate change has 
been ignored in the majority of IDB 
projects in the energy sector, although 
there has been a bit of improvement on 
this count in the lead up to the launch of 
the SECCI in 2006 (see Figure 4). IDB 
is also signifi cantly involved in fi nancing 
climate-related infrastructure develop-
ment through the Initiative for Integra-
tion of Regional Infrastructure in South 
America (IIRSA). IIRSA is coordinated 
by twelve South American governments, 
and the IDB serves as its technical sec-
BOX 10 Risky Business: Biofuels
Increasing oil prices, concerns about energy 
security, and growing efforts to reduce green-
house gas emissions have elevated interest in 
biofuels development. Brazil has pioneered 
the development of biofuel markets, and 
over the past few years there has been enor-
mous interest globally—from Kalimantan 
in Indonesia to the Mid-Western States of 
the United States— in developing biofuel 
production. More than 40 governments have 
taken on commitments to increase the use 
of biofuels. 
Despite these gains, fi rst generation biofuels 
are only cost competitive with fossil fuels 
under the most effi cient feedstock production 
conditions, and only when oil prices are par-
ticularly high. There are many risks associated 
with the biofuel “boom” and their develop-
ment needs to be approached with caution. 
The potential environmental and social costs 
can be high, including the consequences of 
converting forests to cropland for biofuels. 
It is quite possible that biofuel production 
will displace food production, which may in 
turn increase food scarcity and prices, with 
particularly adverse impacts on the poor. Even 
the development of next generation biofuel 
technologies—such as cellulosic ethanol from 
non-food products—may not fully dispel 
these concerns. 
Source: Britt Childs and Rob Bradley, Plants at 
the Pump: Biofuels, Climate Change, and Sustain-
ability, World Resources Institute: Washington 
DC, 2007. 
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retariat (which is also supported by the 
Andean Development Corporation). 
Key initiatives under IIRSA are roads, 
gas pipelines, and power plants that will 
generate electricity that can be traded to 
meet regional needs. More than 40 ener-
gy related projects have been proposed, 
all of which emphasize conventional fos-
sil fuel or large hydropower technologies. 
There are no new renewable energy or 
effi ciency projects currently in the pipe-
line, despite the signifi cant potential for 
such initiatives in the region.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Climate change policies cannot be the 
frosting on the cake of development; they 
must be baked into the recipe of growth 
and social development. The World Bank 
has already been building on synergies 
between climate action and development – 
working on energy security and effi ciency, 
encouraging renewable energy, protecting 
urban air quality, helping with the man-
agement of arid lands, and assisting with 
adaptation of agriculture. Now we need 
to help shift countries to a development 
paradigm based on low-carbon growth 
and adaptation to new risks.” 
— World Bank President Robert Zoellick in a 
speech to the 13th Conference of the Parties 
to the UNFCCC (Bali, 2007).
As international and national policies 
begin to regulate carbon and the costs 
of conventional fossil fuels continue to 
rise, reducing GHG emissions is a serious 
challenge for all countries. All countries 
will also have to adapt to the impacts 
of climate change, even if they have 
played little role in causing the prob-
lem. Through their technical assistance, 
policy advice, and support for project 
implementation, MDBs can support 
developing countries to improve their 
access to sustainable energy supplies 
while reducing the growth of GHG emis-
sions. MDBs can also help developing 
countries reduce their vulnerability to 
the impacts of global warming. 
The Gleneagles Plan of Action on Cli-
mate Change identifi ed a central role 
for the MDBs in helping developing 
countries respond to climate change. 
The Banks are increasingly active in the 
UNFCCC processes. While the MDBs 
have undertaken signifi cant new analysis 
on climate change issues, launched new 
initiatives on climate change and sustain-
able energy, and convened key actors 
around these issues, much remains to be 
done to integrate climate considerations 
into country strategies and project design 
in the energy sector in particular. 
How “Mainstream” is Climate 
Change? 
Although there has been some improve-
ment in the past few years, it is diffi cult 
to identify a trend towards systematic in-
corporation of climate change issues into 
MDBs’ activities. More than 60 percent 
of fi nancing for the energy sector over 
the past fi ve years has not considered 
climate change at all (see Table 1). As 
late as 2007, nearly 50 percent of World 
Bank lending for the sector made no 
mention of climate change, and over the 
last three years less than 30 percent of 
its fi nancing has comprehensively inte-
grated climate change considerations. In 
2007, about 60 percent of the ADB’s en-
ergy portfolio integrated climate change 
criteria; however in 2005 and 2006 more 
than 60 percent of lending ignored cli-
mate change completely. More than 60 
percent of IDB’s lending for the energy 
sector in 2007 did not consider climate 
change at all, and less than 10 percent 
of its fi nancing over the past three years 
has integrated climate change. 
Attention to climate change, as mea-
sured in the energy portfolio, has varied 
signifi cantly from year to year across the 
institutions considered. This is in part 
because support for the energy sector 
tends to be “lumpy,” often involving sev-
eral large scale discrete projects. Renew-
able energy projects are often smaller 
in scale than conventional projects, and 
therefore absorb a smaller share of in-
stitutional resources per project. While 
the MDBs have signifi cant discretion 
over which issues will be prioritized in 
Country Strategies, inconsistent atten-
tion to climate change in the Strategies 
reviewed may refl ect, in part, the pri-
orities of developing member countries’ 
national development agendas (which 
may not always place due emphasis on 
climate change). 
While the MDBs should be a key source 
of technical assistance and knowledge 
on how to integrate climate change into 
economic development, the capacity of 
MDB staff to integrate climate change 
considerations into decision-making 
remains limited relative to the scale of 
the challenge. Departments historically 
staffed by oil and gas experts or thermal 
power plant engineers will need new 
skills and expertise in order to think 
creatively about how to address the 
risks and opportunities that climate 
change presents. Although the MDBs 
have started many new programs related 
to climate change over the past three 
years, they have been slow to prompt 
systematic changes in staff incentives 
to incorporate mitigation or adaptation 
considerations into project development 
and appraisal. Managers at many of the 
MDBs have made some promising initial 
efforts to raise awareness of these issues, 
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and provide training in new skills, but 
much more remains to be done. The 
metrics by which the success of projects 
is gauged do not yet place due emphasis 
on whether opportunities to reduce 
emissions were identifi ed and seized, 
or efforts were made to “climate risk 
proof” investments. MDBs can more 
proactively help make the link between 
stated national priorities and opportu-
nities to mitigate climate change, or to 
adapt to pertinent risks that may arise 
from climate change.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the MDBs are going to remain en-
gaged in energy intensive and fossil 
fueled sectors, then it is imperative that 
they do so in the most climate sensitive 
and energy effi cient ways possible. While 
conventional energy projects are often 
lucrative commercial investments, they 
may not always deliver real sustainable 
development outcomes. The MDBs need 
to support transformative changes in 
key sectors to steer investment towards 
low carbon, environmentally sustain-
able development choices; this will be 
diffi cult to achieve when they remain 
invested in many “business as usual” 
projects and policies. There are several 
examples of strong practice in integrat-
ing climate change considerations into 
Country Strategies and project appraisals 
that need to become universal practice. 
MDBs must follow through on their pub-
lic commitments to help their clients ad-
dress climate change, particularly in the 
energy sector. Progress along these lines 
must be measurable and measured—and 
made much more rapidly than it has 
been to date. 
TABLE 1 Climate Change Considerations in Energy Pipelines of the World Bank, IFC, ADB and IDB
World Bank IFC
Integrates Mentions Ignores Integrates Mentions Ignores
m$ % m$ % m$ % m$ % m$ % m$ %
2000 583.2 16.5 254.5 7.2 2697.1 76.3 0 0 0 0 460.4 100.0
2001 135.8 4.3 220.6 7.1 2759.7 88.6 0 0 0 0 143.6 100.0
2002 542.7 12.8 306.5 7.2 3383.6 80.0 150.0 43.44 18.0 5.2 177.3 51.4
2003 219 10.0 30.0 1.4 1938.8 88.6 18.5 2.0 470.0 51.9 435.0 48.1
2004 732.6 20.4 128.5 3.6 2731.7 76.0 0 0 40.0 12.5 281.0 87.5
2005 652.0 31.9 86.0 4.2 1304.0 63.9 0 0 335.0 66.0 172.4 34.0
2006 364.0 16.2 293.7 13.1 1588.3 70.7 0 0 85.0 13.1 566.3 86.9
2007 486.2 17.3 1015.8 36.2 1302.7 46.5 50.0 5.4 621.0 66.9 257.0 27.7
Total 3714.5 15.6 2335.8 9.83 17706.9 74.5 218.5 5.1 1569 36.7 2493.0 58.2
ADB IDB
Integrates Mentions Ignores Integrates Mentions Ignores
m$ % m$ % M$ % m$ % m$ % m$ %
2000 0 0 53.0 13.2 350.0 86.8 0 0 0 0 1169.0 100.0
2001 8.0 1.4 350.0 62.8 199.0 35.7 0 0 375.0 29.1 915.0 70.9
2002 308.0 30.5 223.0 22.0 480.0 47.5 0 0 0 0 178.0 100.0
2003 35.0 3.4 54.0 5.3 938.0 91.3 0 0 0 0 379.0 100.0
2004 188.0 23.4 0 0 615.0 76.6 0 0 0 0 136.0 100.0
2005 0 0 285.0 23.9 909.0 76.1 0 0 0 0 1202.7 100.0
2006 1317.0 32.8 20.0 0.5 2682.0 66.7 30.0 2.0 582.0 38.0 919.0 60.0
2007 982.0 61.9 615.0 38.3 8.0 0.5 40.0 11.7 0 0 300.5 88.3
Total 2838.0 26.7 1600.0 15.1 6181.0 58.2 70.0 1.1 957.0 15.4 5199.2 83.5
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Since the analysis presented in this policy 
brief has focused on opportunities for 
MDB operations in the energy sector 
to support efforts to mitigate climate 
change, our recommendations empha-
size improvements that the MDBs can 
make to this end. GHG accounting can 
be an enormously useful tool to help 
identify opportunities for energy ef-
fi ciency, and to help project managers 
consider less GHG intensive alternatives. 
Although several MDBs have adopted 
GHG accounting practices for their 
direct operations as well as their invest-
ment portfolios, current practice at the 
MDBs still does not yet consistently 
explore less carbon-intensive approaches 
to economic development. The impacts 
of climate change need to be incorpo-
rated into economic appraisals for the 
projects and policies that the MDBs 
support. Efforts to integrate the cost of 
carbon into project appraisal through 
a “shadow price” mechanism, such as 
those proposed by the IFC (discussed in 
Box 11) are a promising innovation (that 
some private sector banks are already im-
plementing). If properly implemented, 
such a system has signifi cant potential to 
prompt different ways of thinking about 
how to integrate climate change consid-
erations into fi nancing decisions, and to 
internalize the real costs of continued 
investment in GHG intensive “business 
as usual” projects. 
MDBs and their governors need to con-
sider supporting renewable energy and 
effi ciency projects for which stable and 
robust rates of return on an investment 
may not always be guaranteed, and high-
er levels of risk may need to be tolerated. 
The Banks are often still too conservative 
when it comes to investments in energy 
effi ciency and renewable energy tech-
nologies. While the structure and fl ow 
of returns from such investments may 
be less familiar, there is a growing body 
of evidence to suggest that such invest-
ments are in fact far less risky than they 
are often perceived to be. 
The urgency of responding to climate 
change should not, however, lead to the 
imposition of a new form of “green con-
ditionality” where MDBs coerce clients 
into reducing emissions at the expense of 
meeting economic development needs. 
Instead, MDBs must consistently help 
their member countries to assess the full 
suite of options for low carbon, climate 
resilient development. The proposed 
Climate Investment Funds are far more 
likely to be used to prompt transforma-
tive reductions in emissions, if climate 
change considerations are integrated 
into all aspects of the MDBs core opera-
tions. MDBs and the international donor 
community should therefore: 
• Measure and manage the GHG 
emissions associated with invest-
ments in all relevant sectors. 
MDBs need to implement rigorous and 
transparent GHG emissions accounting 
methodologies. Such measures are par-
ticularly important for their investments 
in projects, particularly those developed 
by the private sector. The World Bank 
Group has recently committed to this 
idea in principle, but has yet to opera-
tionalize it. MDBs can also do more to 
help developing countries build their 
own capacity to account for the emissions 
that will result from various development 
choices, and to more effectively con-
sider alternative options to manage these 
emissions. In this vein, country strategies 
could consider options to work with 
and support local capacity—including 
in the private sector—to reduce GHG 
emissions, especially in the context of re-
newable energy and effi ciency. If MDBs 
can help build the capacity of actors and 
institutions in developing countries, such 
as electricity utilities and ministries, to 
measure and manage GHG emissions, 
they may have a transformative impact 
on future emission trajectories. 
• Work with developing country 
clients to identify low carbon ap-
proaches to development. 
MDBs can help developing countries 
assess alternative approaches that might 
help countries reduce carbon emissions 
while still meeting their development 
objectives. The economic impacts and 
implications of climate change need to 
be incorporated into MDB support for 
public sector programs and policies, 
particularly in key sectors for climate 
change mitigation as well as adaptation. 
Here, a shadow price for carbon may 
also serve as a useful tool in conducting 
such analysis (see Box 11). The relative 
costs of options to reduce emissions from 
development projects need to be consid-
ered in the same way as are options to 
minimize other fi nancial costs (see Box 
11). Just as the least fi nancial cost option 
may not always be the best alternative, 
the least carbon-intensive options may 
not always be best suited to meet more 
urgent development goals. Nevertheless, 
project implementers should explore op-
tions to meet any additional project costs 
through funding from special carbon 
funds, the GEF, or other sources such 
as the new Climate Investment Funds. 
The decision as to which of these options 
will best meet needs for environmentally 
sustainable economic development will 
necessarily remain with developing 
country clients. 
16
WRI ISSUE BRIEF: Correcting the World’s Greatest Market Failure
W O R L D  R E S O U R C E S  I N S T I T U T E J u n e  2 0 0 8
• Revise guidelines for country and 
sector strategies to explicitly inte-
grate climate change considerations, 
particularly vulnerability to climate 
variability and change. 
Country Strategies need to identify 
how sectoral policies will affect emis-
sions trajectories in client countries and 
how these strategies will be affected by 
predicted impacts of climate change. 
Strategy interventions in GHG intensive 
sectors should then consider options 
to reduce emissions (such as effi ciency 
measures and best technology options) 
and build the capacity of country insti-
tutions to implement such initiatives. It 
is particularly important for Strategies 
to systematically assess the vulnerabil-
ity of investments in key sectors to the 
potential impacts of climate change, 
and identify specifi c responses to such 
risks. Strategies should also consider 
options for fi nancing incremental costs 
that might be associated with reduc-
ing emissions, and the additional costs 
of adapting to the potential impacts of 
climate change. Climate change should 
be linked to economic considerations in 
country strategies rather than included 
as an afterthought. The goal of such inte-
gration should be to increase the quality 
of information and the range of choices 
available to decision makers, without 
locking client countries into prescribed 
policies or technologies. 
• Maintain high environmental and 
social standards to manage climate 
risk. 
It is crucial to weigh the full economic, 
social, and environmental costs and 
benefi ts of various technology choices, 
particularly in the energy sector, and 
to conduct a comprehensive, life-cycle 
analysis of options available to meet 
the energy needs of member countries. 
Local environmental impacts and po-
tential impacts on local communities, 
as well as the implications for global 
climate change must be emphasized in 
such an effort. It is imperative that high 
standards of due diligence and trans-
parency promote compliance of Bank 
projects with existing environmental and 
social safeguard policies. These policies 
present an appropriate instrument to 
assess and prevent potentially harmful 
impacts of the development process on 
people and the environment, and can 
also further climate risk assessments. 
At the same time, MDBs can work with 
national governments to build the scope 
and integrity of environmental impact 
assessments to this end. 
• Invest in the capacity of govern-
ments to practice good governance 
in order to respond to the realities of 
climate change. 
Climate change is greatly increasing 
the uncertainty around development 
choices. Responding to climate change in 
the context of supporting sustainable de-
velopment inevitably involves intersect-
ing—and often competing—values and 
interests. Fair and effective processes 
for weighing and resolving these inter-
ests are necessary to support effective 
efforts to both mitigate and respond to 
climate change. For example, addressing 
the climate impacts of tropical defor-
estation and degradation demands an 
emphasis on the underlying governance 
challenges that drive deforestation. New 
approaches may be needed to ensure 
that human rights are upheld, and that 
forest dependent people are empowered 
to play a central role in sustainable for-
est management. If new clean energy 
technologies are to be deployed at scale 
BOX 11 Mainstreaming Climate Considerations through Carbon Shadow Pricing
When investors assess the feasibility of in-
vestment in greenhouse gas (GHG) intensive 
sectors, the costs associated with the impacts 
of these emissions are not internalized. Yet 
if the true costs of carbon on the long term 
welfare of the planet are factored in, then 
cleaner alternative energy sources are often 
fi nancially competitive with conventional fos-
sil fuel energy. 
In developing the Clean Energy Investment 
Framework, one approach that has been 
proposed is to integrate a “shadow price” for 
carbon into a fi nancial appraisal of all projects 
in energy intensive sectors. Because the true 
costs of carbon are diffi cult to estimate, project 
managers can use market valuations of the 
costs of complying with regulations aimed 
at limiting GHG emissions, such as current 
prices for carbon in major markets such as 
the EU Emission Trading System. This would 
prompt managers to fully account for GHG 
emissions associated with proposed projects, 
and to consider the real incremental costs of 
pursuing more climate friendly alternatives. 
The idea of a “Clean Energy Support Fund” 
that could be used to meet these incremental 
costs has also been fl oated. 
In early 2008, the International Finance 
Corporation proposed to incorporate such an 
analytical framework into appraisals of invest-
ments in GHG intensive sectors. Operational-
izing such a framework can be a signifi cant step 
towards mainstreaming climate change consid-
erations into decision-making at the MDBs. 
Transparency about the terms on which this 
framework is being implemented, and the im-
pact of “shadow pricing” on decision-making, 
will be essential to ensure the success of this 
effort and to allow other MDBs to learn from 
this important innovation in practice. 
Sources:  World Bank, Progress Report on the Clean 
Energy Investment Framework, September 2007.
David Wheeler, Crossroads at Mmamabula: Will 
the World Bank Choose the Clean Energy Path? 
Center for Global Development, February 2008. 
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then appropriate policy and regulatory 
frameworks that allow investment to 
align with local realities are essential. 
In the absence of defi nitive information 
about how climate change will affect 
specifi c weather conditions in particular 
geographies, it is not possible to “adapt” 
decisions to new circumstances; instead, 
climate variability will need to be in-
cluded in decision-making processes to 
reduce vulnerability. Inclusive, transpar-
ent and accountable processes can help 
integrate climate change considerations 
into local decision-making. The MDBs 
can help build the capacity of developing 
countries to practice good governance; 
they can also lead by adhering to the 
highest standards of transparency and 
accountability with regards to their 
own involvement in both public policy 
reform as well as discrete projects and 
investments.
• Signifi cantly increase support for 
low carbon technologies, particu-
larly in rapidly growing emerging 
economies. 
The MDBs are seeking new ways to 
invest in middle income countries 
where the widespread availability of 
commercial private sector capital is 
reducing demand for their fi nance. Yet 
private fi nancing for renewable energy 
technologies and energy effi ciency pro-
grams is much less readily accessible, 
and urgently needed. Many private 
investors continue to be unfamiliar 
with new low carbon technologies and 
perceive the associated risks to be too 
high. MDBs can play a valuable role in 
supporting the commercialization and 
deployment of low carbon technologies 
and approaches—often in partnership 
with private investors—to help reduce 
future GHG emissions. Such projects 
may be smaller in scale than conven-
tional energy investments and therefore 
more transaction intensive, but the 
“value added” of MDB support for such 
efforts is much greater. While institu-
tions such as the World Bank and ADB 
have adopted specifi c targets to increase 
support for new renewable energy and 
energy efficiency respectively, there 
remains enormous scope to scale up 
these efforts. The MDBs will also need 
to be less conservative when investing in 
renewable energy and energy effi ciency. 
By increasing support for low carbon 
options, MDBs may be able to fi nd new 
relevance in emerging economies. 
• Build capacity and create new 
incentives for MDB staff to consider 
climate change in their interventions. 
Enhanced capacity, knowledge and ex-
pertise within the MDBs will be essential 
if these institutions are to successfully 
help developing countries integrate cli-
mate change considerations into eco-
nomic planning and development. New 
incentives will be necessary to prompt 
project developers within the Banks to 
take this agenda seriously. The establish-
ment of the Climate Investment Funds 
may prompt more systematic attention at 
the staff level to transformative options 
to address climate change through MDB 
interventions in developing countries.
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